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This paper discusses the causes, cures and consequences
of the Asian financial crisis.
Since mid-1997 a number of Southeast Asian economies have
been in the grip of a severe financial crisis that has
thrown the region into a deep recession. On the basis of
expected diminishing returns this has raised doubts about
the durability of the region’s rapid growth rates which
were realized since the 1980’s.
Its very success made it attractive to private capital
inflows which were borrowed in dollars on short terms but
lent out domestically for long periods and intermediated
through poorly regulated domestic financial systems.
Large current account deficits due to overvalued
currencies and overinvestment in the nontradable sector
created an asset bubble which had to burst.
The crisis started in Thailand in July 1997 but has not
been predicted and alarm bells did not ring although the
ratio of short-term debt to foreign reserves had
increased to unsustainable heights and falling stock
prices gave some indication of growing concern.
A key feature of the crisis has been the contagion and
spillover to other countries in the region.
After six months of currency and stockmarket turmoil the
process of cleaning up shattered financial systems did
start, but some obstacles obstruct a rapid clean up.
On the basis of IMF projections world output growth in
1998 has been estimated at 2% (down from 4% in 1997) and
global growth is to recover only moderately in 1999.
There are reasons to believe that the IMF rescue packages
added rather than ameliorated the panic.
Now financial and economic conditions in Asia are
improving and the period of economic and financial
meltdown is largely over. Real activity has reached a
bottom and much of this reflects the improvement in
current account balances.
Incipient signs of recovery are emerging but the path to
recovery remains rocky with significant head wind. While
the symptoms of the crisis have abated and the
underlyhing malaise is better understood, the treatment
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The economies of East Asia have made remarkable economic
progress over the past three decades. After Japan’s
double-digit growth in the 1960s, Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Singapore grew at rapid rates from the mid-
1960s. They were followed in the 1980s and 1990s by the
Southeast Asian economies of Indonesia, Malaysia and
Thailand. All these countries attained growth rates of 8-
10% a year for a decade which was achieved without
increases in income inequality and accompanied by
impressive advances in social development: poverty,
infant mortality and adult illiteracy declined
significantly.
Central to their successful performance was an emphasis
on stability-oriented macroeconomic policices with
reasonable price stability and fiscal outcomes broadly
balanced, the avoidance of overvalued exchange rates,
high rates of physical and human capital accumulation and
export-oriented production encouraging the adoption of
advanced technology. Even though current account
imbalances widened to levels that would be considered
alarming in more consumption-prone countries, the
association of these imbalances with high investment
spending by the private sector and rising shares of
saving in GDP fed the perception of robust and
sustainable growth.
One of the most remarkable aspects of East Asia’s export
performance has been the rapid shift in the composition
of exports from resource- and labor-intensive industries
to more skill- and capital-intensive industries with
specialization in high-technology industries, mainly
electronics. This has caused East Asia to become
increasingly dependent on one another and on fewer
products as their exports exposed them to greater risk of
export instability and contagion. The magnitude and
interdependency of trade links was one of the features of
the Asian miracle fueling rapid regional growth, but
after 1997 these links became a liability since they
provided a perfect channel for the contagion to spread
throughout East Asia.
Favorable initial conditions also played a part such as
strong educational systems and less marked inequalities
in the distribution of income and wealth than in other
developing countries.
Empirical research has attempted to measure the relative
contributions of factor inputs and technological progress
by deducting from growth in output per worker a weighted
average of the accumulation of physical and human capital
per worker with the residual interpreted as total factor
productivity (TFP) growth, i.e. the increase in
productivity brought about by technological progress and
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greater efficiency. Generally, capital accumulation has
been found to have made the largest contribution and
productivity growth made smaller but still significant
contributions. Therefore, the contribution of capital per
worker dominated growth in factor productivity in
explaining growth in output per worker.
Compared with the TFP growth of Europe and Japan during
their fast catch-up years in the 1960s and 1960s, TFP
growth in the East Asian economies has been much less
rapid, although since the early 1980s TFP growth appears
to have played a larger role, especially in China, Taiwan
and Thailand. However, the relative importance of
productivity growth remains contentious. This is
important for the future prospects of the region because
if growth is mainly due to capital accumulation a growth
slowdown is inevitable as diminishing returns to capital
set in. This has prompted Paul Krugman to refer to the
economies of East Asia as a collection of "paper tigers"
whose growth rates are bound to decline with the onset of
diminishing returns. However, given the existing
international differences in productivity levels there is
abundant opportunity for further technological catch-up
in the East Asian countries, especially when differences
in hours worked per worker, which are between 15 and 30%
higher than in the USA, are taken into account.
Since mid-1997 a number of Southeast Asian economies have
been in the grip of a severe financial crisis that has
thrown the region into a deep recession. This has raised
doubts about the durability of the region’s rapid growth.
The regions’ very success - rapid growth, conservative
economic management and low indebtedness - made it
attractive to private capital. These inflows, while
spurring growth, were intermediated through poorly
regulated domestic financial systems and helped fuel
domestic credit expansion and produced three weaknesses
in the foundation of East Asia’s growth:
* Large current account deficits, financed with short-
term capital inflows, exposed the Asian economies to
sudden reversals.
* Liberalization of domestic financial markets without
adequate prudential regulation and supervision allowed
banks and corporations to assume unhedged foreign
borrowing that left them vulnerable to sudden currency
fluctations.
* In the absence of fully developed bond and equity
markets, companies borrowed heavily from banks to finance
their rapid expansion and became very highly leveraged
with corporate debt-equity ratios of four to one or more
which were 30 to 50% higher than the US’s ratios. Equity
finance in East Asia was more expensive than debt finance
due to the need to pay a risk premium. The high corporate
debt levels, resulting from high savings by households
held in bank deposits, allowed heavy investments but also
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made firms vulnerable to shocks that disturb cash flows
or interest rate rises. A significant rise in interest
charges may not be able to be met out of profits so that
it will have to be recapitalized into debt which may
threaten the firm’s viability. The debt mountain was at
the heart of the problem in Korea.
Although high savings and high debt yield powerful
advantages for national development, if they are
accompanied by loose financial regulation and loose bank
supervision they may endanger the stability of the Asian
high debt model, thereby helping to set up a crisis. The
rush to capital liberalization in the early 1990s without
serious regulation was a most irresponsible act.
Domestic corporate borrowers could borrow abroad half as
cheaply as at home. Unmonitored capital inflows and an
uncontrolled credit boom increased the vulnerability in
two dimensions:
* The ratio of short-term debt to foreign reserves, as a
measure of the ability to meet current obligations from
own liquid resources, rose sharply from 1994 to 1997 to
well over 150% by June 1997, except for Indonesia where
it remained at high levels.
* The ratio of M2 money to reserves indicates the
potential for a run on the foreign exchange reserves by
own residents of a country when there is a loss of
confidence in the local currency. Countries with exchange
controls and less open capital accounts are less
vulnerable by this measure.
When markets became worried about the sustainability of
the fixed exchange rate in Thailand, capital inflows
became outflows. Asset values, i.e. equities and
property, plummeted and turned a virtuous circle into a
vicious one. Falling asset values reduced wealth and
imposed balance sheet losses on financial agents, demand
fell and contracting markets produced greater outflows.
Finance stampeded to safe havens, making the situation
worse.
The trends in the crisis countries were not sustainable
before the crisis and the region was unquestionably
heading for a significant slowdown, even in the absence
of a crisis. This conclusion is based on the growing
capital intensity of output, the tendency for the
efficiency of new investments to decline, substantial
evidence of strain in the financial system due to a
growing burden of nonperforming assets and signs of
overcapacity and losses in the industrial sector and
considerable overbuilding and asset price inflation.
The Asian crisis is best seen as a story of rapid growth
built on an incomplete foundation, which was left exposed
to the winds of international capital markets.
The crisis is largely one of debt refinancing, in which
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creditors have run away from the Asian currencies leaving
the borrowers unable to continue to finance their loans.
The solution is to restore confidence, which requires
overcoming the collective action problem in which no
lender wants to refinance for fear that others will not.
This is where the IMF enters the picture, in organizing a
refinancing effort and in helping to erect the structure
of financial regulation that will help to minimize the
risks of a melt-down occurring again.
With hindsight it is useful to describe the crisis as
passing through four phases:
* Denial that the crisis could spread beyond South East
Asia.
* Panic which involved a drastic change in the approach
taken by the US government which first abandoned the
notion that the IMF should manage the crisis while in
December 1997 it sharply reversed its attitude by urging
American banks to roll over loans, including interest
payments to Asian banks and companies. The lack of a
mechanism for orderly workouts of corporate and bank debt
undoubtedly contributed to the full-scale financial
panic.
* Confrontation which involved addressing a rapidly
deteriorating situation in Indonesia after New Year 1998
when it blatantly ignored the conditions laid down in the
$43 billion IMF package of loans. Panic sharpened when
Indonesia’s budget, published on 9 January 1998, simply
repudiated the IMF conditions. This mobilized forces by
the USA and the IMF to contain the crisis.
* Absorption, implying that it is no longer possible to
shield from the fact that the world has changed
profoundly.
The Asian financial crisis has involved several
interlinked phenomena. The countries to be discussed more
or less explicitly in this paper are Thailand, South
Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.
2. Balance of payments situation.
The single most dramatic element has been the rapid
reversal of private capital inflows into Asia. Banks (in
Thailand and Korea) and private corporations (in
Indonesia) were the main forces behind the capital
inflows, not the government. Net private inflows dropped
from $93 billion to -$12.1 billion, a swing of $105
billion on a pre-shock GDP of $935 billion, or a swing of
11% of GDP.
It is very difficult to attribute a reversal of this
magnitude in such a short period to time to changes in
underlying economic fundamentals. Therefore, some other
factors must be involved.
The surge in capital inflows had its roots in changes in
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both internal economic policies and world markets.
* Internationally, capital market liberalization in the
industrialized countries facilitated a greater flow of
funds to emerging markets. Low interest rates in the US
and Japan favored increased outward investment to
Southeast Asia.
* Domestically, five broad factors contributed to the
capital flows:
1) Continuing high economic growth of some 7%;
2) Financial deregulation made it easier to tap into
foreign capital;
3) Lax supervision allowed banks to take on substantial
foreign currency and maturity risks;
4) Predictable exchange rates (due to pegging to the US
dollar) reduced perceived risks for investors;
5) Governments gave tax breaks that encouraged foreign
borrowing.
These capital account surpluses were accompanied by
exchange rates which appreciated significantly in real
terms between 1990 and early 1997. Due to overvaluation
of its currencies East Asia has been confronted with
growing current account deficits. The real appreciation
exceeded 25% in each of the four Southeast Asian nations.
The real appreciation has been caused by the pegging of
the exchange rates to the dollar, which rose
significantly since 1995. Moreover in 1994 China had
devalued with 40% while the Japanese Yen had depreciated
with 25%. However, because a large share of transactions
(probably 80%) were already conducted in the free
parallel "swap" market before the 1994 reform the
effective devaluation of the Chinese yuan is estimated at
7 to 8%. Furthermore the own inflation rate in the East
Asian countries was higher than the American inflation
rate. All these factors contributed to a loss of
competitiveness as demonstrated by the current account
deficit. 1)
As expected with the real appreciation, export growth
rates fell sharply in 1996 and 1997 and this should have
provided some indication that investment quality was
weakening and that firms would be less able to repay
foreign exchange obligations.
The current account deficits reflected not public sector
dissaving, but shortfalls of private saving relative to
extraordinary high investment:
X - M = (S p - I p) + (T - G) < 0
This investment was financed by short term foreign capi-
tal inflows, attracted by relatively high rates of return
and interest rates.
International Lending to East Asia (in billion US dol-







Capital flows from abroad can indeed be an important
engine for growth if they are channeled to productive
investment activities. However, they can make
macroeconomic management more complex when they are
large, volatile, unsustainable and poorly utilized.
In that case macroeconomic pressures may manifest
themselves through two channels:
* Capital inflows lead to a real appreciation and an
expansion of non-tradeables sectors (e.g., real estate)
at the expense of tradeables sectors and a slowdown in
export growth.
* Capital inflows place new pressures on underdeveloped
financial systems in the form of excessive risk taking,
poor banking judgments, and even outright fraud.
The inflow of foreign funds into Asia was a precondition
for the subsequent crisis, but the capital inflows do not
by themselves provide an explanation of the crisis that
followed.
3) Banking Crisis .
Thanks to deregulation and liberalization, the number of
commercial banks exploded. An empirical study by Kaminsky
and Reinhart (1996) has shown that financial liberaliza-
tions signal 71% of balance of payments crises and 67% of
banking crises! Banking crises are more likely to occur
in liberalized financial systems, especially those with
weak institutional environments.
With respect to the linkages among the crises, in the
1980s and 1990s, banking crises proliferated; in about
half of the cases the banking crisis got underway before
the balance-of-payments crisis. While the issue of
causality remains nebulous, knowing that there is a
banking crisis underway helps to predict currency crises.
Most banking crises in the sample were preceded by
financial liberalization; statistically, financial
liberalization plays a significant role in explaining the
probability of a banking crisis. The reason is that
liberalization came without an adequate regulatory and
supervisory framework to accompany it. Increased risk-
taking by banks on the wake of financial deregulation may
be a cause of the banking problems.
Kaminsky and Reinhart have found very few instances of a
causality running from a balance-of-payments crisis to a
banking crisis so that knowing that there is a balance-
of-payments crisis does not help predict a future banking
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crisis. It remains true however, that recessionary
conditions characterize the periods preceding both
banking and balance-of-payments crises.
In East Asia banking activity has increased steadily as
is shown by the high growth rates in deposits and
credits. However, a basic mistake of banks was:
* Borrowing short in dollars
* Lending out long in local currency, often in unproduc-
tive investments.
Therefore, banks transformed their own illiquid assets
into short-term liquid ones for the foreign investors.
This allowed the possibility of bank runs and large capi-
tal outflows in case of expected devaluation.
Then, in the case of pegged exchange rates investors have
a "one-way option": they reap capital gains by selling
domestic currency if the peg collapses and the currency
devalues, but they will not suffer losses if the peg is
maintained.
Banks have provided excessive or unwise (speculative)
credits (largely in real estate) to the private sector,
often in unproductive, low-quality investments
(unprofitable golf-courses) with implicit government
guarantees but insufficent monetary supervision.
Prestigeous projects (highest building in Kuala Lumpur,
longest bridge between Sumatra and Malaysia) were set up
with high cost.
Perhaps the most important weakness was the limited
institutional development of banks. E.g., much of the
lending was done on a collateral basis, rather than on a
cash-flow basis, thus obscuring the need to analyze
profitability and riskiness of projects. Credit tended to
flow to borrowers with relationships to government or
private bank owners and to favored sectors rather than on
the basis of cash flows.
For example, in Korea corporations were limited in
raising funds abroad or in selling domestic-currency
denominated securities to foreign investors, but merchant
banks had carte blanche to borrow abroad and were subject
to only limited supervision. Since many of the merchant
banks were under de facto control of the chaebols, they
were able to channel foreign funding to them.
Banks were encouraged to finance risky projects in the
expectation that they would enjoy profits, if any, while
the government would cover losses.
This is the " moral hazard " problem. A moral hazard crisis
arises when banks are able to borrow funds on the basis
of implicit or explicit public guarantees of bank
liabilities. If banks are undercapitalized or under-
regulated, they may use these funds in overly risky or
even criminal ventures.
Krugman argued that the Asian crisis is a reflection of
excessive gambling and stealing by banks which gained
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access to domestic and foreign deposits by virtue of
state guarantees on these deposits. The potential
availability of government guarantees encouraged
borrowers and lenders to act imprudently. Excessive risks
have been taken in the expectation that a government will
bail out when things go wrong. Implicit government
guarantees, high domestic funding costs and the creation
of offshore banking centers all created incentives for
excessive borrowing abroad.
Excessive lending and over-investment created inflation,
not of goods but of asset prices, based on the assumption
that the demand for offices, hotels and luxury homes
would continue to soar. This overpricing of assets made
the financial condition of financial institutions seem
sounder than it was.
The overcapacity caused rents and asset prices to fall,
which made the insolvency of banks visible, forcing some
to cease operations.
Therefore, loans were over-guaranteed but under-
regulated. Such a bubble persists so long as government
guarantee is maintained.
4. Overinvestment.
Investment rates have been exceptionally high in East
Asia in the 1990s at around 40% of GDP. There is some
evidence suggesting that the efficiency of investment has
declined partly due to their rapid catch-up and
convergence toward the level of per capita income of the
advanced economies and partly due to over-investment.
This may be indicated by some measures.
* Comparing an economy’s real rate of return on
investment to its real rate of growth is a commonly used
method. If the return on investment is lower than the
growth rate, welfare in terms of consumption for both
current and future generations will be enhanced by
reducing investment. However, in practice the rate of
return on investments (which vary with the riskiness of
projects) for an economy as a whole is difficult to
measure.
* Comparing gross investment with gross capital income is
a method taking account of the riskiness of projects.
If investment consistently exceeds capital income there
may be overinvestment because capital accumulation is
absorbing more resources than all past investment made
available for consumption.
* The incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) which
measures the ratio of investment to the change in output
is another measure of the efficiency of investment. A
rising ICOR indicates a declining output response to
investment and thus a falling efficiency of investment.
* Increased portions of investment have been in non-
traded or protected sectors, such as real estate or
petrochemicals that generate low returns in sectors with
excess capacity.
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* Government policies may provide access to easy credit
allowing firms to pursue investment objectives with
inadequate attention to profitability.
Evidence provided by the IMF’s Economic Outlook of
October 1998 on most of these measures suggests that
investment in recent years in a number of East Asian
countries was excessive.
5. Triggering events.
A crisis requires a triggering event that leads short-
term creditors to expect a panic flight of other short-
term creditors. In a panic short-term creditors suddenly
withdraw their loans from a solvent borrower.
In general, a panic can occur when three conditions hold:
a) short-term debts exceed short-term assets;
b) no single private-market creditor is large enough to
supply all of the credits necessary to pay off existing
short-term debts;
c) there is no lender of last resort.
Then it becomes rational for each creditor to withdraw
its credits if the other creditors are also fleeing from
the borrower, even though each creditor would also be
prepared to lend if the other creditors were to do the
same.
The essence of a panic is that a bad equilibrium occurs
that did not have to happen. The panic may result in
large economic losses: premature suspension of investment
projects, liquidation of the borrower, creditor grab
race, etc.
With the possible exception of Thailand, foreign
investors apparently did not play a large role in
triggering the crisis. Data do not suggest a massive
outflow of foreign capital during July-December 1997.
Foreign investors appear to have reduced their holdings
prior to the crisis and increased their holdings in the
first few months of 1998. Hedge funds and other short-
term investors played a limited role in triggering the
crisis. The massive reversal in capital flows arose
mainly from:
* the reluctance of foreign lenders to roll over short-
term claims after September 1997 causing an outflow of
about $50 billion;
* the purchases of foreign exchange by local corporations
to cover open positions and in Indonesia capital flight.
At almost the same time cracks began to appear in Korea
and Thailand in early 1997.
* In January 1997, Hanbo Steel collapsed under $6 billion
in debts and it was the first bankruptcy of a Korean
chaebol in a decade. In the months that followed, Sammi
Steel and Kia Motors suffered a similar fate. These bank-
ruptcies put several merchant banks under significant
pressure since much of the foreign borrowing of these
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firms had been channeled through these banks.
* In early February 1997 in Thailand Samprasong Land
missed payments due on its foreign debt, signaling the
fall in the property markets and the beginning of the end
for the financial companies which had lent heavily to
property firms. The Bank of Thailand committed almost all
of its liquid foreign exchange reserves in forward
contracts to speculators that correctly guessed a
devaluation of the baht. Speculators bought forward
foreign exchange in the expectation that they could sell
them later at a higher devalued local currency price. By
late June 1997, net forward sales of reserves equaled
gross reserves. In June the Thai government removed
support from a major finance company, Finance One, so
that creditors incurred losses. This accelerated the
withdrawal of foreign funds and prompted the depreciation
on July 2, 1997.
The Thai baht devaluation triggered capital outflows from
the rest of Asia which have been caused by:
* Bank failure in Thailand.
* Corporate failure in Korea.
* Political uncertainty due to the potential for a change
in government in Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and
Indonesia.
* Contagion. Many creditors treated the region as a whole
so that if Thailand was in trouble, the other countries
probably would have similar difficulties and experienced
a loss of government credibility. Malaysia, the
Philippines and Indonesia were hit hard by contagion
effects.
* The IMF intervened by recommending immediate
suspensions or closures of financial institutions which
actually helped to incite panic.
Therefore, the withdrawal of funds triggered a chain
reaction which quickly developed into a financial panic.
The exchange rate depreciation itself sparked new
withdrawals of foreign exchange because foreign lenders
became more concerned that their customers would be
unable to repay their debts and grew increasingly
reluctant to roll over short-term loans.
The banking system quickly came under intense pressure.
The losses of their foreign exchange exposure and the
rise in non-performing loans eroded the capital base of
the banks, exacerbated by the fall in the stock market.
The withdrawal of funds set off a liquidity squeeze and a
sharp rise in interest rates, reducing the profitability
of local firms.
The rapid evolution into panic was aided by policy
misjudgments and mistakes.
* Had Thailand responded to the fall in property prices
in early 1997 by floating the baht and moderately
tightening monetary and fiscal policies, the Asian
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financial crisis probably could have been largely
avoided.
* Thailand and Korea made the mistake of trying to defend
their exchange rate peg until they had effectively
exhausted a substantial proportion of their foreign
exchange reserves.
* Thailand and Korea injected large sums into failing
financial institutions, opening a large hole into the
fiscal positions of their governments.
* Malaysia announced the formation of a large fund to be
used to prop up stock prices, then abandoned the plan a
few days later.
* In Indonesia, the state enterprises were instructed to
withdraw a sizeable portion of their deposits from the
banking systems and to purchase central bank notes,
adding to the intense liquidity squeeze and driving up
interest rates. Large investment projects of dubious
value were postponed, then given the go-ahead, and
postponed again, adding to the confusion.
Once the trigger was pulled, several powerful feedback
mechanisms amplified the withdrawal into a panic.
Undercapitalized Japanese banks with heavy exposure in
the rest of Asia felt downward pressure on their balance
sheets and began to call in loans. Similarly, Korean and
Hong Kong banks called in loans from the rest of Asia.
The Hong Kong dollar came under attack in November due to
the loss of trade competitiveness and banks faced steeply
rising interest rates on liabilities.
The New Taiwan dollar also came under pressure and fell
sharply despite its huge stock of reserves.
The first banks whose investments failed to yield requi-
red returns got bailed out, but the cost of bailouts
reduced government willingness to provide future rescues.
Without government guarantees asset prices fell, leading
to loan defaults and losses for banks.
Falling asset prices made the insolvency of banks visi-
ble, forcing them to cease operations, leading to further
asset deflation.
Non-performing loans threatened the liquidity and
solvency of financial institutions.
Soft disclosure rules on providing information and lax
supervision allowed banks to regard a loan as "perfor-
ming" even if no interest has been paid for a year.
(In the US a loan is called "bad" if interest is not paid
for the last 3 months).
Borrowers were repaying loans in plummeting local curren-
cies, making the banks dig into their own pockets to meet
their dollar obligations.
6. Non-prediction on the basis of fundamentals.
One of the most unusual aspects of the Asian crisis is
the extent to which it was unpredicted by market
participants and market analysts. Warnings by observers
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were rare. In mid-1997 all signs pointed to a very recent
and dramatic shift in expectations.
Capital inflows remained strong enough till mid-1997. The
only exception was in the equity markets in Thailand and
Korea, where foreign investors became uneasy in 1996. In
Malayisa and Indonesia stock market and bank lending
remained strong till mid-1997.
With respect to the risk premia attached to loans to
emerging markets, a recent study by W.Cline and K. Barnes
found that bond spreads (i.e., the interest premium over
US treasury securities) even fell in emerging markets,
including Southeast Asia between mid-1995 and mid-1997
well below what could be justified by economic
fundamentals.
Syndicated loans spreads were also low and falling before
the crisis. Only in Thailand did spreads begin to rise
somewhat in early 1997, but from a very low base.
The rating of sovereign bonds provided by agencies such
as Standard & Poor and Moody’s did not signal increased
risk until after the onset of the crisis itself. Long
term sovereign debt ratings remained unchanged until mid-
1997, except for the Philippines.
The country risk ratings of a number of independent firms
such as the Euromoney Country Risk Assessment changed
little or even improved between March 1993 and March
1997. Only Thailand’s and South Korea’s ranking fell
sharply after the crisis had begun.
The forecasts of leading investment banks, such as
Goldman Sachs, show that the dramatic slowdown in export
growth in 1996 and 1997 was unanticipated. No one in the
market anticipated the extent to which currencies would
depreciate, even once the crisis began.
In its overall market forecasts as published in its World
Economic Outlook the IMF gave very little indication of a
sense of macroeconomic risk to the Asian region.
In its country assessments according to its Article IV
consultations with member countries the IMF expressed
concerns about the Asian economies, in no case major
concerns, but in the context of overall optimism.
Stock prices provided the only indication of growing
concern among market participants in the months preceding
the crisis.
* The Thai stock market fell continuously after January
1996;
* The Seoul bourse also fell sharply over 1996 and early
1997;
* In Malaysia the stock market began to turn down in
March 1997;
* In contrast, in Indonesia both the stock market and
bank lending showed continued confidence until mid-1997.
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7. Non-ringing alarm bells.
Many of the signals that analysts normally associate with
impending problems showed little sign of deterioration.
Most fundamentals remained sound throughout the early
1990s.
* Government budgets registered regular surpluses in each
country. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand,
Korea maintained a fairly responsible budgetary position
between 1990 and 1996.
* Inflation rates have been below 10% across the regions
during the 1990s.
* Sovereign debt remained at prudent levels and had been
steadily falling in the Philippines and Indonesia.
* Domestic savings and investment rates were very high
throughout the region, suggesting that even if foreign
capital flows slowed, robust growth could continue.
* Foreign exchange reserves at the end of 1996 were well
over 4 months of imports in each country except Korea
with 2.8 months.
* World interest rates have been unsusually low in recent
years, so that the burden of repaying foreign obligations
did not seem onerous.
* Although some important prices (e.g. semiconductors)
slumped, key commodity prices have been relatively stable
so that external terms of trade changed little.
* Of course, the Japanese economy has been very sluggish
throughout the 1990s, but the US economy as the major
market for Asia had been very robust.
In sum, the macroeonomic fundamentals across Asia seemed
sound and the usual alarm bells were not ringing so that
the crisis was not easily predictable.
8. Signs of growing risk.
However, there were several signs of growing financial
vulnerability during 1996 and early 1997.
* In some cases (e.g., growing current account deficits,
overvalued exchange rates and slowing export growth),
imbalances grew with the need for a modest adjustment,
but there was no sign of an impending major crisis.
* In other cases, important indicators appeared to have
been missed by the market (e.g. rapid expansion of
commercial bank credit and growing short term foreign
debt).
In line with the high levels of capital imports, current
account deficits were growing increasingly large across
the region. Between 1990 and 1996, current account
deficits averaged 4% of GDP and in most countries were
rising. But the current account deficit is not always a
good predictor: Indonesia and South Korea, with the
smallest deficits, have arguably been the hardest hit
countries.
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In line with the current account deficits and large
capital inflows, exchange rates appreciated significantly
in real terms between 1990 and early 1997. The real
appreciation exceeded 25% in each of the four Southeast
Asian nations, and was especially rapid after 1994, when
the US dollar began to appreciate. While they signaled
the need for some kind of correction, the appreciations
were not nearly as large as those in Latin America, where
Mexico appreciated by 40% between 1988 and 1993, just
before its most recent crisis.
As expected with the real appreciation, export growth
rates fell sharply in 1996 and 1997 and this should have
provided some indication that investment quality was
weakening and that firms would be less able to repay
foreign exchange obligations.
Probably the biggest signs of growing risk were in the
financial sector.
Much of the credit to the private sector expanded very
rapidly, with much of it financed by offshore borrowing
by the banking sector, headed for speculative investments
in real estate markets rather than into increasing
productive capacity for manufactured exports as in
earlier periods. Total obligations to foreign banks of
the five countries grew from $210 billion to $260 billion
in 1996 alone.
The use of short-term foreign currency borrowing to
finance domestic investments in real estate and other
non-tradeable activities was particularly dangerous.
Banks became increasingly vulnerable:
1) Borrowing in foreign exchange and lending in local
currencies exposed banks to the risk of foreign exchange
losses from a depreciation.
2) Borrowing offshore in short-term maturities and
lending onshore with longer payback periods exposed banks
to the risk of a run.
A particularly telling indicator is the ratio of short-
term debt to foreign exchange reserves. This measures a
country’s short-term foreign liabilities to its liquid
foreign assets available to service those liabilities in
the event of a creditor run. In mid-1997 in Indonesia,
Thailand and Korea short-term debt exceeded available
foreign exchange reserves. In Thailand, foreign-currency
debt with a maturity of less than 2 years equaled to
about 120% of foreign exchange reserves and nearly 200%
in Indonesia and Korea.
Although this does not necessarily cause a crisis, it
renders a country vulnerable to a financial panic. (In
1997, South Africa showed major vulnerabilities to panic,
but without the occurrence of a crisis. This confirms the
multiple-equilibrium character of financial panics.)
Once a crisis started, each creditor knew that there were
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not enough liquid foreign exchange reserves for each
short-term creditor to be fully paid, so each rushed to
be the first in line to demand full repayment.
Under normal circumstances, short-term debts can be
easily rolled over. However, once creditors begin to
believe that the other creditors are no longer willing to
roll over the debt, each of them will try to call in
their loans ahead of other creditors.
Only businessmen and local investors seem to have
foreseen the crisis in Thailand and Korea and to a lesser
degree in Malaysia. No one predicted the crisis in
Indonesia. In contrast, international analysts and
forecasters and international financial markets did not
clearly forsee the crisis in any of the countries.
9. Self-fulfilling Crisis.
Any arbitrary pessimistic piece of information could
trigger a self-fulfilling spiral. The expectation of what
others will do is crucial to the possibility of self-
fulfilling crises and shifts in investors’ assessments of
market sentiment could trigger such a crisis.
Markets began to doubt the sustainability of external
deficits, the high short-term external debt, the collapse
of property price bubble and the increasingly apparent
weakness of banks. Falling profits due to deteriotating
competitiveness contributed to falling equity prices.
In May 1997 the Thai Central bank heavily intervened in
the spot and forward exchange market and allowed interest
rates to rise, contributing to fall of equity prices on
stock market. These measures failed to restore
confidence. In face of continued large capital outflows,
Thailand on 2 July 1997 abandoned its exchange rate peg
against the dollar and floated downward. This devaluation
increased foreign debt in local currency!
10. Contagion .
A key feature of the Asian crisis has been the existence
of contagion or spillover effects.
There may be several reasons for expecting crises to be
contemporaneous in time. However, it is difficult to
distinguish empirically the different forms of contagion
from each other.
1) Common causes or "monsoonal" effects.
These are defined as major economic shifts in industrial
counries that trigger crises in emerging markets, such as
policies undertaken by industrial countries that have
similar effects on emerging markets or terms-or-trade
shocks.
E.g., a depreciation of the yen, relative to the US
dollar, has been associated with slowdowns in real export
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growth in the Asian crisis countries. A decline in world
semi-conductor prices had an adverse effect since chips
are a key export product of many crisis countries.
2) Spillover effects.
These result from interdependence among developing
countries themselves. A crisis in one country may affect
macroeconomic fundamentals in other countries through
trade or capital market linkages. This is likely to be an
important source of contagion in the affected Asian
countries.
A devaluation of one currency may have an adverse effect
on the international competitiveness of other countries,
putting downward presure on their currencies as well. Not
only do these countries tend to export to the same
destinations, but they also tend to export similar
products. Export competition among the countries may have
intensified over the last few years as all crisis
countries moved in the direction of increasing their
shares of semiconductors and capital goods while reducing
their shares of apparel, footwear and household goods.
Since the bilateral trade shares with Thailand of Korea,
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines are smaller than
5%, it seems unlikely that bilateral trade with Thailand
could be the main driving force of contagion.
However, the competitive dynamics of successive
devaluations may be a partial explanation for why Asian
currencies came under increasing pressure after the
initial depreciations of the Thai baht and Indonesian
rupiah. The Asian emerging economies do have important
trade links with one another (between 25 and 45% to their
total exports is traded with one another) and they also
compete in third-country markets.
Financial linkages may mean that events in one country
negatively affect another country. Investors from outside
the region may be forced to sell assets in one country in
response to losses in other countries.
Empirical work on testing capital market linkages suggest
that there are strong contagion effects across stock
markets.
In the lead-up to the Korean crisis, Korean banks had
accumulated substantial amounts of high-yielding
Brazilian and Russian government debt. At the same time
there was also substantial Brazilian investment in
Russian debt. When Korean banks encountered severe
liquidity problems they began to sell off their Brazilian
and Russian assets, leading to falls in asset prices in
these countries and knock-on sales of Russian debt by
Brazilian investors.
3) Pure contagion effects.
A crisis in one country may conceivably trigger a crisis
elsewhere for reasons unexplained by macroeconomic
fundamentals, perhaps because it leads to shifts in
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market sentiment or changes the interpretation given to
existing information. A crisis in one country may lead
creditors to reassess fundamentals in other countries.
Pure contagion involves changes in expectations that are
self-fulfilling, with financial markets subject to
multiple or "sunspot" equilibria for given values of a
country’s macroeconomic fundamentals.
Explanations of crises based on sunspots do not save
policymakers from any blame for the speculative crises.
Policymakers should try to ensure that they avoid the
range of fundamentals in which multiple equilibria are
possible, e.g. by reducing their exposure to short-
maturity foreign currency debt.
In this respect the "wake-up call" hypothesis has become
a known phenomenon. It is called a wake-up call because
private creditors and rating agencies were judged asleep
prior to the outbreak of the Thai crisis. The implication
is that if one country has difficulties, then such an
event leads investors to reassess their view of other
countries. If investors find the same weaknesses in the
other countries their credit ratings are reduced and the
crisis spreads. In this respect contagion is rationalised
if countries are perceived as a group with some common,
but imperfectly observed characteristics, like common
culture, or temperament. Then if one country abandons its
peg, the willingness of other such countries to defend
their parity may be revised downward.
Some contagion may be exacerbated by sheer imitation or
herding behavior , which can be explained if one or more
of three effects are present.
1) Payoff externalities such that the payoff to an agent
adopting an action is positively related to the number of
other agents adopting the same action.
In this respect bandwagon effects may be relevant.
As an example it may be assumed that:
- Investor 1 has information on real estate market;
- Investor 2 about financial condition of banks;
- Investor 3 on internal government discussions.
Now, if investor 1 gets some negative information he may
sell, inducing 2 and 3 to do the same even if they have
neutral or even positive information, and the outcome may
be that markets overreact.
2) Principal-agent considerations such that a manager, in
order to maintain or gain reputation when markets are
imperfectly informed, may prefer either to "hide in the
herd" to avoid evaluation or to "ride the herd" in order
to improve reputation. In this respect one has to realize
that much invested money is managed by agents rather than
directly by principals. These managers are remunerated by
comparison with other money managers. Therefore, they act
alike: "I feel worse if I lose money in a devaluation
when others do not, than I will if I lose the same amount
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of money in a general rout".
3) Information cascades when later agents, inferring
information from the actions of prior agents, optimally
decide to ignore their own information.
It has been argued that all three of these elements
played a role in the Asian crisis. Analysis of movements
in exchanges rates and stock prices across countries in
response to announcements and events in other countries
in East Asia revealed that there were were important
spillovers.
In this respect it is important to distinguish pure
spillovers from co-movements that are due to similarities
in changes in underlying fundamentals. However, in
practice this is difficult. If expected fundamentals and
risks change in similar ways for all East Asian countries
during a period, co-movements may arise as rational
market responses. Similarly, capital flows may exhibit
co-movements.
In a recent paper Kaminsky and Schmukler analyzed the 20
largest one-day swings in stock prices in US dollars
since 1997 to see what type of news moved the markets in
days of extreme market jitters. Some of the largest one-
day downturns cannot be explained by any apparent
substantial news, either economic or political, but seem
to be driven by herd instincts of the market itself. Most
movemetens are triggered by local news, not news of a
country’s neighbor.
In fact, the initial attack on Thailand quickly widened
to other members of ANSEAN (The Philippines, Malaysia and
Indonesia) which were confronted with a loss in
competitiveness. Even Taiwan, completely unnecessarily,
chose to let its currency join the decline and competiti-
vely devalued.
However, competitive devaluations are unlikely to be the
major cause for the contagion. The World Bank has
calculated that if one East Asian country devalues alone
versus the dollar, the required devaluation to restore
competitiveness varies between 10 and 20%. Howefer, if
all five affected countries devalue at the same time, the
required devaluations increase only by ½ to 1 percentage
points. As the difference between the two scenarios is
relatively small competitive devaluations appear
insufficient to explain actual depreciations.
Trade links between countries were probably a more
significant mechanism than competitive devaluation to
explain contagion. Intra-regional exports among East
Asian countries accounted for almost 40% of total exports
in 1996, up from 32% in 1990, reflecting a process of
specialization and outsourcing of activities from the
more advanced to the lower income countries in the
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region. Such trade complementarity increases the speed of
the contagion.
Spillover effects beyond the Asian region remained fairly
limited, although in Latin America the Brazilian real
came under downward pressure due to concerns about compe-
titiveness, so that investors required a rise in interest
rates, as was evident from the rising bond yield spreads
over US Treasury bonds in mid-1997.
Following several waves of pressure in emerging markets
emanating from Asia, Russia became a new source of
contagion during August 1998. The immediate cause of the
Russian crisis was the growing loss of financial market
confidence in the country’s fiscal and international
payments situation leading to a loss of international
reserves and an inability to roll over treasure bills as
they matured. Although external developments including
the Asian crisis and associated energy prices contributed
to Russia’s difficulties, domestic policy shortcomings
were more important, such as the failure to bring the
fiscal situation under control which led to levels of
public debt and debt-service payments that appeared
unsustainable.
Observers have come to different conclusions as to
whether the contagion effects are evidence of irrational
investor behavior or more conventional fundamental
causes. If due to panic credits are suddenly and
uncessarily withdrawn while economic conditions are
viable, then, the economy should be protected through
lender-of-last activities. If the crisis results from the
end of a bubble or the end of moral-hazard-based lending,
lender-of-last operations should be avoided because they
keep the inefficient investments alive.
11. Obstacles to a Rapid Clean-Up.
After six months of currency and stockmarket turmoil
plenty of Asia’s financial institutions have technically
left bankrupt. But hardly any have been liquidated and
the process of cleaning up shatterred financial systems
did barely begin end 1997.
In principle, next steps are required:
* The sale of assets held by defunct institutions.
However, liquidating bad loans is difficult. When a
company in Europe or America cannot pay its debt, its
creditors force it into bankruptcy, where a judge can fix
a repayment plan or liquidate the firm and divide up the
assets. But in Asia’s troubled economies, it is more
likely to be the creditors who end up in trouble.
Not all the property will come under the auctioneer’s
hammer immediately. Many debtors prefer to see their
creditors in court, what may take a few years.
In Thailand, in December 1997 the government announced
that 56 finance companies would and had to be closed
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down.
* Survivors raise more capital, merge or find a foreign
owner.
In Malaysia, the central bank is preparing now to force
bank mergers, having for years failed to persuade banks
to merge by asking them nicely.
Exchange rates in the Asian crises countries have
recovered somewhat since early 1998, but downward
pressures have continued in many emerging markets,
hampering foreigners’ efforts to value potential
investments.
Also hampering efforts to bolster banks with foreign
capital is the difficulty in putting a price on anything
in a collapsed market.
Rigid labour laws are a further deterrent: in Korea the
National Assembly refused to make it easier for insolvent
banks to lay workers off.
Moreover, there are legal obstacles to foreign ownership
of banks and property, which prevent direct investment by
foreigners. E.g. in Thailand foreigners were until
recently not allowed to own more than a minority share in
Thai property. This radical measure has a slow response.
As Asia begins to clean up from the financial meltdown of
1997, the lack of legal process is a serious hindrance.
E.g., so long as insolvent companies can keep operating
with impunity, the restructuring of Asia’s over-indebted
corporate sector will be indefinitely delayed.
Without massive injections of foreign capital it is hard
to see how Asia can restore solvency to its banking
systems, let alone ease its liquidity crunches.
The challenge in East Asia is to avoid a spiral of
competitive devaluations and to restore confidence while
dealing with insolvent financial institutions.
Restructuring of foreign debts is a way by changing
short-term loans into long term debt.
There are some principles for bank restructuring. Only
viable institutions should stay in business and losses
should be allocated transparently while minimizing the
cost to taxpayers. Restructuring should be fast enough to
restore credit while maintaining confidence in the
banking system. Next table presented by the World Bank
presents the different options for bank restructuring
entailing difficult trade-offs. A higher figure in the
cells of the table should be interpreted as better.
If the government were to bail out troubled banks by
supplementing bank capital with public resources, the
strategy would have the advantage of speed, but at a high
cost to the treasury and low incentives for bank managers
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to improve performance.
If the government were to recapitalize distressed banks
and sell them later, this would lower fiscal costs,
provide better incentives for bank performance and raise
confidence in the banking system, but at the probable
cost of making the process longer.
Liquidating and paying off creditors and depositors would
provide a speedy solution, give better incentives for
bank performance and entail relatively low fiscal costs,
but this might severely undermine the confidence in
banking system.
Balancing these trade-offs will vary from country to







Bailout 6 1 1 2
Assisted
mergers
3 5 3 4
Recapitaliza-
tion and sale
2 4 5 4
Restructuring
plan
2 6 4 3
Liquidation
and payoff
5 3 6 1
12. Consequences for the World Economy.
The delay in Asian growth has negative consequences for
industrial countries:
1) The Asian countries import less from rest of then




2) Devaluations of Asian countries makes them super-
competitive, so that they export more; moreover, the glut
in electronics forces price cuts.
3) Cheaper imports from Asia holds down inflation and
interest rates, which raises investment and compensates
decreased exports in the rest of the world.
Next table shows the output projections in annual percent
changes presented by the IMF in its October 1998 World
Economic Outlook.
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1996 1997 1998 1999
World 4.2 4.1 2.0 2.5
USA 3.4 3.9 3.5 2.0
Japan 3.9 0.8 -2.5 0.5
EU 1.7 2.7 2.9 2.5
Asian NICs 6.3 6.0 -2.9 0.7
Lat. NICs 3.5 5.1 2.8 2.7
Russia -5.0 0.9 -6.0 -6.0
On the basis of these projections world output growth in
1998 is estimated at 2% and global growth is to recover
only moderately in 1999.
In Asia, while exchange rates have stabilized and in some
case recovered significantly from their lows, the
economic downturns in the crisis countries and Japan have
worsened beyond expectations with particularly sharp
declines in activity in the first half year of 1998 in
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. The weakness of
the Japanese economy and the yen has put additional
pressures on financial markets in the crisis countries.
Growth has continued to be well sustained in the USA and
Europe. For US, the brake from Asia is not bad: it might
replace an otherwise tightening of monetary policy as
America’s economy roared by 4%. As in North America,
growth in Europe appears thus far to have been relatively
little affected. While external positions vis-à-vis Asia
have worsened, domestic spending has been stimulated by
declines in long-term interest rates since mid-1997. The
contractionary effects of the Asian crisis on exports
have been largely offset by the expansionary effects of
improved terms of trade, lower interest rates and
continued strong growth in many non-Asian markets.
Deteriorating economic conditions in Asia were a key
factor behind the further falls in commodity prices in
the first half of 1998.
Growth prospects have been marked down for Asia, Russia
and to a lesser extent for many emerging market countries
in other regions.
World trade growth is projected down to 3¾ in 1998 mainly
explained by the Asian crisis.
In Latin America the weakness of oil prices has
contributed to downward growth projections for Colombia,
Mexico and Venezuela. Increases in interest rates
associated with financial market pressure have affected
growth prospects negatively. In Brazil growth in 1998 and
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1999 is projected to slow down considerably from the 3¼%
rate achieved in 1997.
For the countries at the center of the crisis downward
revisions in projected 1998 growth range from 3 to 10
percentage points, with the largest revisions for
Indonesia and Malaysia where output is to contract by 15
resp. 6½%. In all the crisis countries, indicators of
overall activity point to deep recessions in 1998.
The impact of the Asian crisis on poverty and human
welfare is of considerable concern. The economic
contraction is affecting the lives of millions and
aggravating social vulnerabilities: falling incomes,
rising absolute poverty and malnutrition, declining
public services, threats to educational and health
status, increased pressure on women and increased crime
and violence. Various factors are adversely affecting
real household incomes, including currency depreciation,
higher interest rates, financial sector collapse,
corporate bankruptcies, job losses and supply
bottlenecks, including national calamities.
In Indonesia the number of poor are estimated by the IMF
to increase by 9.2 million persons (5% of the
population), in Korea 0.7 million (2% of the population)
and in Thailand 1.3 million persons (2% of the
population).
13. IMF Programs.
The IMF aimed to dismantle the high debt system, despite
the developmental advantages of such a system and wanted
to see a western-type financial system in its place
through a huge reduction in levels of corporate debt.
However, to change an established high-debt/equity
structure is not easy.
The IMF programs for Thailand, Indonesia and Korea had
nine main declared goals:
* prevent outright default on foreign obligations;
* limit the extent of currency depreciation;
* preserve a fiscal balance;
* limit the rise in inflation;
* rebuild foreign exchange reserves;
* restructure and reform the banking sector;
* remove monopolies and reform the domestic non-financial
economy;
* preserve confidence and creditworthiness;
* limit the decline of output.
To achieve these objectives the programs have six key
policy components:
* Fiscal policy contraction;
* Bank closures;
* Enforcement of capital adequacy standards in order to
recapitalize the banks.
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* Tight domestic credit to defend the exchange rate by
raising interest rates;
* Debt repayment backed by bailout funds mobilized by the
IMF;
* Non-financial structural changes aimed at reducing
tariffs, opening sectors for foreign investment and
reducing monopoly powers.
In fact, currency depreciation and stock market collapse
continued long after the IMF programs were signed and
there was no sign of restoration of confidence. Bank
closures in Thailand and Indonesia added to the panic
rather than stemming the outflow.
This may be attributed to unexpeceted contagion effects,
political uncertainty and poor implementation of the
programs.
There are reasons to believe that the design of the
program added to rather than ameliorated the panic.
1) Bank closures.
Abruptly shutting down financial institutions only served
to deepen the panic and ignited a bank run, adding to the
liquidity squeeze. The vulnerability of expectations adds
to self-fulfilling creditor runs. The closures set off a
flight to safety. Two-thirds of Indonesia’s banks had
experienced runs on their deposits. A large number of
banks were facing growing liquidity shortages.
A far better approach would have been to implement a
longer-term strategy of bank restructuring.
2) Bank recapitalization.
The sharp increase in non-performing loans and the effect
of exchange rate movements eroded the capital bases of
even the strongest banks.
Pushing banks hard to recapitalize and to add to their
capital quickly within an unrealistically time frame has
caused a more severe credit crunch.
3) Monetary policy.
The tightening of quantitative credit limits has switched
off the lender of last resort mechanism of central banks
increasing the panic. The IMF’s insistence on raising
interest rates and demanding a fiscal surplus led to an
unnecessarily harsh economic contraction (I’M Fired!).
The question is whether any benefits with respect to the
exchange rate as expected by the IMF outweigh the
negative effects on short-run production.
Despite sharply higher interest rates currencies have not
appreciated so that the IMF supposed benefits of this
policy are in question. In fact, exchange rates continued
to plummet after the signing of IMF programs.
By undermining the profitability of their corporate
customers, higher interest rates discouraged foreign
creditors from rolling over their loans.
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4) Fiscal policy.
It is not clear why government budgets were made so
central to the IMF program since fiscal policy had been
fairly prudent across the region and was not the source
of the crisis.
The IMF argued that fiscal contraction was necessary to
reduce the current account deficit. The fiscal targets
simply added to the contraction. Later, in February 1998,
the IMF has rethought its position and allowed Thailand
to run a small fiscal deficit.
One of the fundamental difficulties with the IMF packages
was that they prescribe tighter budgets and tighter
monetary policy aimed at sharply restricting aggregate
demand. The objective was to free up resources by
squeezing down domestic consumption so that producers
could devote more output to sales in global markets.
However, this contributed to deflationary pressure on
world markets evoking protests from competitors in G-7
countries which might complain about dumping. The
resulting global excess supply in the markets of goods
produced in Asia may have the effect of bringing about a
collapsing currency with the attendant rise in the burden
of repaying debts in foreign hard currencies.
Therefore, the IMF package may result a currency collapse
because it squeezes down domestic demand where excess
supply already exists. The only way to increase global
demand in the face of the collapse of domestic demand is
to depreciate sharply. Indeed, after IMF programs were
announced in Indonesia and Korea, their currencies
dropped more sharply than currencies like those of Taiwan
and Singapore, where IMF programs have not been
introduced.
14. The case of Indonesia.
This is a country where the government derives its
legitimacy by delivering economic success, rather than
from a truly democratic mandate. That success has
protected the government.
The moral hazard cum bubble model seems to be less
appropriate for Indonesia. Much of the lending to
corporations was unprotected by government guarantees.
Stock market and international credit ratings performed
very well right up until early July in 1997.
Indonesia seems to be a clear case of contagion leading
to panic and ultimately to a severe economic contraction.
Indonesia has been hardest hit in the region and appears
to be the clearest case of contagion in the region.
Indonesia’s imbalances were among the least severe in the
region, although there were many problems and weaknesses:
under-supervised banks, extensive crony capitalism,
corruption, monopoly power and growing short-term debts.
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Indonesia was applauded for first widening the rupiah’s
band to 12% and then moving to a float without spending
its foreign exchange reserves in a futile defense of the
currency.
When the rupiah did come under severe attack in August
1997 the government abruptly raised interest rates which
intensified the short-run pressure. The government
canceled 150 investment projects and a few days later
reversed its decision, adding to the confusion.
By early September, Indonesia had joined Thailand,
Malaysia and the Philippines in the crisis.
Since reserve levels remained strong at well over $20
billion, Indonesia did not seem an obvious candidate for
an IMF program.
When nevertheless Indonesia signed its first IMF program
on October 31 1997 the rupiah strengthened but the boost
was very short lived.
As the impact of bank closures and bank runs, higher
interest rates and decapitalization of the banks set in,
the rupiah depreciated by 23% and the stock market fell
by 19% between November 3 and December 4, 1997.
Within a couple of weeks of the start of the IMF program,
Indonesia began to look even weaker than its neighbors.
In December the effects of the severest drought in many
years set in with food prices rising and food shortages
emerging, while the foreign exchange cost of food imports
rose and world petroleum prices fell.
The prospect of a severe illness or death of Suharto
added to the ongoing panic. The crisis in Indonesia
became as much political as it is economic and they fed
off each other.
A big problem was the interrelationships between govern-
ment officials, banking managers and the business commu-
nity, which easily might lead and in fact has led to cor-
ruption. There is ample anecdotic evidence of scandals in
the newspapers!
The conditions attached to the IMF program were:
* Monopolies of wheat flour and sugar had to be
eliminated and 12 lavish infrastructural projects should
be postponed.
* Cartels in cement, paper and plywood would be
dissolved.
* Subsidies on energy and tariffs on food would be cut.
* 16 out of 240 banks had to be shut to win approval for
a loan from the IMF. However, one controlled by a son of
President Suharto promptly reopened in a new guise,
casting the government’s commitment to a cleanup into
doubt.
In fact, Mr. Suharto was asked to dismantle an economic
structure which had created enormous fortunes for his
sons and daughters. He should institute fundamental
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reforms which would undermine his own position. It was
questionable whether he would be prepared to do so, but
he has been forced to resign in favor of Mr. Habibie.
15. Conclusions and lessons for policy makers.
Since the crisis may be viewed as a case of multiple
equilibria, (as demonstrated by South Africa), the worst
of the crisis could have been avoided with relatively
moderate adjustments and appropriate policy changes.
Without question, there were macroeconomic imbalances,
weak financial institutions, widespread corruption and
inadequate legal foundations in the affected countries.
These problems had been well-known for years and the
Asian-5 countries were able to attract $211 billion of
capital inflows between 1994 and 1996.
Krugman’s explanation that investors knew that their
investments were to weak borrowers but felt protected by
explicit or implicit guarantees seems to be only a
partial explanation because much of the lending was to
private firms that did not enjoy these guarantees.
The actual market participants while recognizing the
fundamental flaws did not foresee a crisis with or
without bailouts.
A more moderate adjustment would have been possible had
appropriate steps been taken in the early days of the
crisis.
Next lessons for policy makers may be relevant:
1) A policy of tying a currency to an anchor country is
unsustainable if the own inflation is relatively high.
2) Current account imbalances must be financed properly,
preferably not by volatile speculative capital inflows.
3) Defense of a currency by invervention is only
justified if the financial system is strong enough to
handle long periods of high interest rates.
4) The extent to which capital movements are destabili-
zing depends largely on the strength of a country’s
financial system and soundness of its economic policies,
that are under control of governments.
5) Financial liberalization requires strict bank regula-
tion and supervision.
It is clear that too much investment money has flown into
these economies than could be profitably employed at
reasonable risk.
Financial markets need reliable information to work
efficiently. If lenders would have had better information
about the reserves of Thai banks, they would have pulled
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back sooner and the eventual problems would have been
less severe.
16. The Present situation and the long term prospects:
Is the crisis over?
Financial and economic conditions in Asia are improving
with output finding a bottom and interest rates falling
sharply. Much of this reflects the improvement in current
account balances and the reduction of payment pressures.
Although the recession is largely over, recovery, albeit
from low levels, is only a forecast and not a reality.
The focus is shifting from recession to recovery.
Competitive exchange rates and low interest rates make
good preconditions for recovery.
In most countries, real interest rates are still too
high, given the low levels of economic activity. Thus,
central banks are using any opportunity, such as local
currency strength and cuts in the US Fed funds rate, to
cut domestic interest rates. Although currencies have
strengthened slightly and interests rates have come down
sharply, there is still room for interest rate declines.
The improved interest rate scenario is welcome news for
equity and real estate markets.
Overcoming head winds, especially in the financial
sector, remains a key challenge. Valuation and
restructuring risks remain high. Property prices are now
closer to fair value but vacancies have surged and more
supply is coming, so that property prices are likely to
drop another 5%-15% on average.
Within the region the largest risk is renewed recession
in Japan, where the economy is on shaky ground and the
relevance of the Keynesian liquidity trap and Ricardian
equivalence seem to be present. Confidence is low and the
government’s banking reform strategy remains ineffective
despite increased funding.
The long term prospects are favorable because the
depreciations have improved competitiveness; the skill
levels are high; the savings propensity is high and the
economies are characterized by openness. Perhaps a long
crisis is not to be expected. The first signs are
favourable.
The Asian-5 trade merchandise trade performance has
resulted in a trade adjustment of $120 billion from a
deficit of $40 billion in the first half of 1997 to a
surplus of over $80 billion in the first half of 1998.
This reflects lower imports and unchanged exports.
The stagnation of export revenues reflects two factors:
* lower export prices in US dollars, which have masked
the effect of higher volumes and
* weaker domestic demand in the importing Asian markets,
especially Japan.
The fall in import bills can be attributed to the decline
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in Asian-5 domestic demand and to sharp increases in the
relative price of imports.
These surpluses will help countries to reconstitute their
depleted foreign exchangs reserves so that they are
becoming less dependent on financing flows and thereby
restore confidence of investors in the ability of the
authorities to meet normal demands for foreign exchange
promoting the recovery of capital inflows, supporting the
stabilization of exchange rates and permitting gradual
easing of interest rates.
Within just a few weeks since the Annual Meetings of the
IMF and the World Bank in September 1998 the expectations
of many participants seem to have shifted strongly and a
sense of greater calm has returned to the markets even
with a more cautious attitude among many participants.
Although the immediate downside risks have eased, they
have not dissipated. While the symptoms of the crisis
have abated and the underlying malaise is better
understood, the treatment is only just beginning.
In Korea and Thailand, the financial indicators -
appreciating exchange rates, falling interest rates and
very strong reserves - have been signaling that a turning
point in the countries’ performance is approaching and
confidence is rising that a recovery should begin during
1999. The Philippines by its prompt policy response has
avoided the worst effects of the crisis suffered by its
neighbors and Indonesia has been following a path to
recovery. In all these countries, the key to sustainable
longer-term growth lies in determined implementation of
structural policies. With almost no exception, countries
did not retreat behind protectionist barriers nor have
they rolled back the measures of liberalization already
undertaken.
The period of economic and financial meltdown is largely
over and real activity has reached a bottom, but the
region’s economic downturn has been much deeper than
expected and in the property sector, where deflation has
been the general response to the crisis, supply (excess
capacity) and demand (decline) conditions continue to
deteriorate. The property sector adjustment still to come
will be a drag on Asia’s recovery and the restoration of
financial health and construction will be weak for
several years ahead.
Competitive exchange rates plus much lower interest rates
provide good preconditions for recovery, but the poor
health of banks, along with high unemployment and
substantial overcapacity, will be a drag for some time.
Governments have increasingly felt obliged to act as
principal agents that clear banks’ balance sheets by
absorbing the bulk of nonperforming loans by swapping
them for government bonds. This boosts government
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interest expenses at a time when fiscal balances are
already under pressure from the economic downturn.
Government deficit projections for 1998 are 9% for
Indonesia, while Korea, Malaysia and Thailand will run a
deficit of some 4% to 5% of GDP. Government deficits are
set to rise in 1999 and last for many years until
economies have fully recovered. Funding government
deficits will require huge increases in private net
saving. As the current account balances in all the crisis
countries have moved from deficit into surplus this
points to huge net private saving in excess of current
government deficits. With overcapacity still large, banks
reluctant to lend and weak labor markets undermining
household confidence, private net saving will likely stay
elevated for several years. Depositor confidence is the
key to tapping private saving, but the banking crisis has
shaken that. If short-term interest rates are low and the
yield curve upward-sloping, banks may buy government
bonds. Given the weakness of domestic demand and banks’
reluctance to lend to the private sector, crowding-out
effects will probably be small. External fiscal funding
will be limited. Capital flows to the region are unlikely
to perk up much at all soon.
With capital flows dwindling, trade flows are becoming a
more prominent driver of the exchange markets. On this
score, Japan’s current account surplus will provide
support for the yen although this may be offset by
capital outflow from Japan because of revived interest in
US stock markets due to expectations of further lowering
of US interest rates. However, the critical factor for
the outlook of Asian currencies is not the US dollar rate
against the yen but the level of Japanese economic
activity. If the yen’s strength depresses Japanese
exports and compresses domestic demand further, the
consequences for Asian economies will be negative. The
impact of the yen as a driver for Asian currencies will
likely diminish in 1999 as investor flows start to return
to the region.
In sum, the first-half 1998 production collapse has
stopped and output stabilization is underway. Incipient
signs of recovery are emerging in some countries, but the
path to recovery remains rocky with significant head
winds. Korea and Thailand have taken solid steps in
financial sector restructuring and Malaysia and Indonesia
have barely begun.
Overall, a mild export recovery appears to be taking
shape. However, with the global economy expected to slow
into 1999, the prospects for East Asian exports are
increasingly uncertain.
In South Korea the reform process has yet to turn the
corner. Thailand as the good student graduates to the
next level and has started to see some gain for its pain.
The Philippines tries to ride out the storm with its new
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skipper, the Estrada administration, at the helm.
Malaysia has isolated itself from the financial markets
and is beginning its own brand of reform.
The importance of offshore production in the form of
foreing direct investment in East Asia by developed
countries is decelerating in favor of a trend towards
regionalisation in the developed countries themselves.
The redeployment of production to low-wage sites
increasingly takes place within the major regions in the
developed countries rather than between the regions in
global networks. However, in our opinion this trend is to
be explained more by the requirements of flexible lean
production than by the existence of overinvestment in
East Asia which was mainly in the non-tradable sector due
to the real appreciation of their currencies.
As the end of the centure draws to a close, it is
possible to think of a " policy standard " that creates
confidence through the robustness of economic
institutions and policies. There was a global crisis, a
crisis of the international financial system, some
elements of which have not been sufficiently adapted to
keep pace with the evolution of the markets. But global





1) Although on the basis of current account deficits East
Asian currencies were overvalued, on de basis of
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in terms of the Big Mac
Parity about the price of hamburgers all over the world
as published by The Economist twice a year,
undervaluation seems to be relevant. The question arises
how to reconcile these two seemingly contradictory
statements.
The answer is provided by the famous " productivity bias ".
This bias shows that in high productivity countries the
relative price of tradables with respect to non-tradables
is low in comparison with the situation in low-producti-
vity countries such as the East Asian economies.
The explanation proceeds along the labour market mecha-
nism which requires that wages in the different sectors
are equalized if labour is mobile between sectors.
A productivity rise in tradables which does not lead to a
change in its price allows a rise in wages which is being
transferred to the non-tradables sector where there is no
increase in productivity, so that the price of non-trada-
bles rises.
Now, if the price level in both countries is the same,
this lower price ratio of tradables with respect to non-
tradables in the high-productivity country requires a
lower exchange rate in the high-productivity country on
the basis of the law of one price for tradables, so that
its exchange rate is overvalued with respect to PPP.
Or by the same reasoning, a low productivity country has
a higher exchange rate than the high productivity country
while the price level is the same in both countries, so
that the exchange rate of the low productivity country is
undervalued. This was the situation in East Asia.
Therefore, the productivity bias reconciles the
overvaluation in terms of current account deficits and
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